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It would not be over-stating the case to say that forsome time Europe has experienced a general sentimentthat justice should be put on a higher place in the
priority list that all political agendas, even at an
international level, should have. I for one would like to
recall the recent Manifesto for Justice that has been issued
in this country, thanks to a common effort made by a
coalition of legal organizations and consumer groups.
There may be different underlying reasons why justice is
deemed to deserve a more central role in the consideration
of both domestic and European institutions and
programmes. Some of these may have to do with regional
problems reflecting upon the malfunctioning of national
legal systems in terms of, for example, insufficient
standards for access to justice, or lengthy trials. But there
is common ground in what is a largely shared analysis of
how the natural and somewhat abstract notion of justice
should be translated into every day life via the work done
by all relevant parties –namely the view that unless the
judiciary is assigned a crucial role and is empowered with
reasonable means to satisfactorily meet the public’s
demands, then all hopes for the improvement of a crippled
system seem to be lost.
In the author’s opinion, we have to proceed from the
assumption that no legal system can ever aspire to
acceptance by its daily “consumers” anywhere in a civilized
world, if the judiciary is not adequately safeguarded by
broad principles which give it and all of its members the
certainty that, in doing their jobs, they have nothing to fear
or nothing to gain. The core issue in my view is as follows:
that each advanced legal system should be built on the idea
that judges have to be allowed to work with no other
perspective or goal than the performing of their function.
This amounts to a basic concept of judicial independence,
and my following observations are largely based around
this principle.
Obviously, no one can ignore the fact that the debate
becomes increasingly heated when attempts are made to
identify the concrete measures through which the process
aimed at making judicial independence stronger should be
conducted. But that is a further element to be dealt with
once there is common agreement as to what judicial
independence is, and has been historically. Suffice it to say
that now we should all contribute to constructing a
European manifesto for law that is not aimed at widening
political gaps, but at exchanging experiences and proposals
in a constructive and unifying way.
First of all, I have to clarify that, when looking at the
Italian situation which forms the main focus of this paper,
I refer to the judiciary as to the body made up of both
judges and public prosecutors according to our
constitution, and to the law that depicts only one judicial
career for both these categories. As I have said, one
characteristic feature of most European legal systems is
that the judiciary may suffer no interference from other
state bodies and is protected, although in different ways,
from any intrusion that is capable of putting undue
pressure on its members. If one seeks to trace the historical
and political background of this fundamental aspect of
European democracies it is easy to recognize the impact
that Montesquieu’s idea of a modern state has exercised on
the matter.
So, the independence of the judiciary should be read as
a way to reaffirm that the legislative and administrative
powers should not influence the administration of justice –
that is the process through which justice must be seen to
be done, to put it as described by Lord Hewart in the
rightly celebrated Rex v Sussex Justices case in 1924. It is a
well-known fact that political interference might
jeopardize judicial impartiality and, at the same time,
undermine the principle according to which all citizens are
equal before the law. This is why maintaining an
independent judiciary is one of the vital tasks that all
democratic states should undertake, because failure to
achieve this goal puts the very essence of democracy at risk.
This is also why a number of the constitutions adopted by




The author considers the need to safeguard judicial independence at both
national and European levels.
European countries contain very stringent and precise
provisions touching upon this.
INDEPENDENCE OF THE ITALIAN
JUDICIARY
I will now try to give an illustration of the attitude that
the Italian constitution has shown towards the judiciary
and also to give a few examples of what factors could
weaken its status. In the second part of this article I will
concentrate on the implications that the judgments of the
European Court of Justice may have on the organisation
and functioning of the Member State’s national courts, in
order to establish whether these decisions may affect, and
if so to what extent, the independence and autonomy of
the judiciary.
The independence of the Italian judiciary is safeguarded
through a solemn declaration contained in article 101 of
the constitution which states that “Judges are only
subjected to the law”. The reference to the law as the only
binding force on judges makes it clear that no external or
internal interference, strong or prestigious as it may be,
could ever be placed on the judiciary and, on the other
hand, that the judges have not only the right but also the
duty to turn down any such approach and operate only on
the basis of what the law says.
Legal authors and the vast majority of judicial opinions
agree that a direct consequence stems from the principle
set out by article 101. This is that although the freedom the
judiciary enjoys in interpreting the law requires a judge to
take into account a series of criteria, such as the literal, the
finalistic, the golden rule (as it is called in the common
law), Parliamentary debates, , in the end, it is only up to
him/her to decide what is the meaning, scope and ambit of
a particular disposition or of a broader text. Obviously,
such an option is always open to the judicial review at its
highest level, by the Corte di Cassazione.
A relevant consequence of this fundamental freedom can
be seen in judicial immunity, whether at civil, criminal or
disciplinary level, in the process of interpreting the law,
provided there is no proof of bad faith or gross negligence.
Another constitutional disposition is aimed at re-affirming,
beyond any reasonable doubt, the nature of judicial status:
article 104 provides that the Italian judiciary gives rise to
an autonomous body that is independent on any other
power. In order to give effectiveness to the judiciary’s
independence the constitution has set up the Consiglio
Superiore della Magistratura, that is the authority presided
over by the President of the Republic, whose members are
elected by two-thirds of all professional judges and
magistrates, and one third by the two Houses of
Parliament. This is the governing authority as far as judges’
careers and discipline are concerned.
Another consequence of the protection recognized at
constitutional level to Italian judges is that they can only be
transferred or removed from office following a decision by
the Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura or with their
consent. In the framework of the Italian legal system the
independence of the judiciary is recognised as being of
value in its own right, but is also depicted as a goal to
achieve for the benefit of citizens. This implies that if
judges have a constitutional right to be independent and
not to be deprived of their status, at the same time all
citizens have a right to be judged in an independent and
unbiased way by the very judge (the so called “natural
judge”) who, by pre-existing law, should be allocated the
case. Therefore, the principle of due process of law has
been fixed to make sure that the defendant ’s right to a fair
hearing is guaranteed and that all judicial proceedings are
to be led by an impartial and unbiased judge in accordance
with the requirement fixed by Article 6 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.
The same principle has another field of application,
namely the length of trials, which may not exceed
reasonable time limits. If the contrary occurs the state will
be held liable to the affected individuals, and the judge
responsible for not speeding up the process may be
disciplined. Also, it is prescribed that when making their
decisions judges have to give reasons, if their orders are not
to be quashed by the Corte di Cassazione.
One point should be reiterated – that when speaking of
the judiciary the expression comprises both judges and
public prosecutors. The constitution also gives public
prosecutors the same recognition of independence as that
conferred upon the judges. A debate has been going on for
a long time in heated terms in Italian political circles as to
the possible modification of the situation, and to the
feasibility of a system similar to the French model where
public prosecutors belong to the executive.
If one tries to summarize the current position of the
Italian magistracy, it can be said that its influence over the
general context of public life is very wide and deep. This is
partly due to the magnitude of the powers with which
Italian judges and magistrates are invested, as set out above,
but is also partly due to the customary reading of all
judgments in the light of political evaluation of their impact
and of their authors’ intention.
This may not sound reassuring or dignified, and it is also
sad. But it would be unrealistic to ignore the turbulence
that has affected the relationship between the judiciary and
politics over the past few years. This sometimes head-on
clash reveals an unenviable and divisive feature that has
transformed the political arena into a place where judges
risk being defended or accused in relation to their
supposed political views rather than for the merit of their
decisions. But a very strong barrier in defence of the
prerogatives the constitution has devised as a shield has
been erected over the years by the Corte Costituzionale, the
court that is empowered to quash or repeal any legislative
instrument that is found to collide or be inconsistent with
the constitution itself. 13





On a variety of occasions the Corte Costituzionale has
intervened to proclaim the sanctity of the judiciary, and
rule that no liability can be incurred by judges in the
performing of their duties with the sole exception of
patently unjustifiable conduct. The Corte Costituzionale has
also stated that all judicial orders may be appealed against
before it, particularly if they are not sufficiently grounded
in terms of argumentative reasons and of immunity from
law errors.
The final impression from this holistic review of the
Italian position is that any attempt at reconstruction
should always take into consideration what alterations or
adjustments to the legal framework the relevant law could
bring about. Furthermore, one cannot overlook that today
all discussions on judicial topics in Italy must unfortunately
come to terms with political implications and innuendos:
whether or not this may lead to a growth of awareness of
the judiciary’s crucial importance as the guardian of
individual and social rights remains to be seen. Personally,
I doubt very strongly that this will happen because society’s
loss of confidence in the judiciary is something that needs
to be remedied without compromising the constitutional
safeguards.
It is worth noting that a Government Bill aimed at
judicial reform has been under Parliamentary scrutiny for
some time now: the process is far from being finalized, and
doubt surrounds its outcome. The spirit of this fiercely-
contested reform may be described as an attempt to
redefine the ladder of the judicial hierarchy, particularly
through the re-introduction of selective contests for the
upgrading and promotion for judges and magistrates. This
is a very controversial issue that has lead to an
unprecedented row between government and judiciary,
and there is no easy way to resolve it.
Another controversy at the heart of the reform concerns
the definition of the conduct, acts or omissions which give
rise to a disciplinary infringement. The Bill moves towards
such a definition, making it compulsory for the holder of
the public prosecutor’s office with the highest responsibility
(Procuratore Generale presso la Corte di Cassazione) to proceed
with the appropriate indictment. As has been said above,
Italy is now being faced with a proposal that exhibits a truly
divisive character: it is also a sign that judicial waters are
still troubled and it is up to the academics to take upon
themselves the burden to try and build a bridge over them.
JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE AT NATIONAL
AND EUROPEAN LEVELS
Earlier I thought it was necessary to isolate two
questions as being of paramount importance in the tackling
of the topic, both at national and European level. The first
concerns a clear identification of the circumstances that
may enable the competent office to promote a disciplinary
action against a member of the judiciary for actions
committed while in office. Logically, a preliminary
question has to be raised regarding whether or not such an
initiative should be compelling on the holder of the power,
or whether it should be seen as the exercise of a
discretionary power which should not be made the object
of any possible review (as has been the Italian case so far).
On the same issue it must be asked whether holders of
the office for the disciplining and prosecution of members
of the judiciary should continue their judicial careers, and
so be judges or magistrates themselves, or be wholly
independent (for example as members of the Government
or representatives of the public interest). In Italy, we have
a concurrent assignment of the task to both the head of
Public Prosecutors of the Corte di Cassazione (the highest
authority of all Italian public prosecutors) and the Minister
of Justice. They act separately and independently, and their
prerogatives are of a discretionary nature, so they do not
have to give reasons if they abstain from making an
indictment following an official on individual complaint.
It is a highly controversial question whether, in a country
such as Italy where it is compulsory to prosecute someone
who is officially accused of a criminal offence, the
exclusion of the same rule in the disciplinary field is
reasonable. My experience as Vice-Chairman of the
Disciplinary Court of the Consiglio Superiore della
Magistratura during the 1998–2002 term is that the system
is inherently contradictory and can lend itself to being
questioned for its lack of transparency. The issue of what
conduct can be seen as being worthy of disciplinary
sanction is growing more contentious, and the current
state of perplexity is bound to grow when disciplinary
violations are not recorded in a written text.
Once again this is a gap which needs to be filled by a
discretionary power that may be used leniently or not
according to circumstances (eg when dealing with conduct
that only shows a lack of sufficient professional standards
on the part of the judge, rather than a deliberate breach of
duties).
It would be interesting, but impractical here, to
scrutinize disciplinary reports of the CSM to see how that
body has reacted to the miscellaneous sets of cases it has
faced since its formation in 1959.
One certain fact is that a disciplinary code, even if
drafted in wide and general terms, could alleviate the
hardships now placed on the disciplinary judges’ shoulders
and might eliminate the risk of inconsistent decision-
making that hangs over them and casts many doubts as to
the efficiency of their judgments.
The third question is deep-rooted in the value of
impartiality as a prerequisite for the whole system to retain
its credibility in the eyes of the public, and as a goal to be
fulfilled in every act of the administration of justice. In
particular, the question relates to the feasibility of judges
conducting a political career in parallel with their judicial
activities. If a judge (or a public prosecutor) is a candidate14
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in a political competition should he/she leave his/her office
permanently or on a temporary leave? Could he/she
compete in a constituency which coincides with the
jurisdiction of his/her previous judicial office? And what
about the public manifestation of political views by judges
and magistrates when in office? Could all this give rise to a
suspicion of bias and result in a diminished degree of
impartiality?
The memory of pre and post Pinochet (N.2) decisions
by the House of Lords as for judicial bias (in particular in
Locabail, 2000) cannot fail to impose its weight on this
debate. Of course, no magic response to all these questions
exists, apart perhaps from the well-known maxim dating
back to the 1852 dictum by Lord Campbell in Dimes v
Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal according to which “no
man should be a judge in his own case” (nemo iudex in re
propria). In my view, much emphasis should be placed on
(and a great deal of benefit would come from) self-
discipline and self-restraint, but, on the other hand, the
legislator should make his voice heard in this field by, at the
very least, laying down a few fundamental guidelines to be
observed by all members of the judiciary, backed by
varying degrees of criminal sanctions in the event of
violation.
JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT
OF JUSTICE
The second part of this article is devoted to a brief
examination of certain judgments by the European Court
of Justice, and in particular to two sets of circumstances
both related to decisions made by that court. The first,
dating back to September 30, 2003 in re Köbler, clearly
makes Member States responsible for their own judiciary’s
violation of any source of European law, such as Directives,
once it is established that the violation is committed by a
last resort court; that it has as its object a community law
disposition involving individual rights; that it is self-
evident; and, finally, there is a direct link between the
violation itself and the damages suffered by the aggrieved
party.
It is perfectly clear that a new form of judicial
responsibility – this time towards the state itself – adds to
the list of the causes of judicial mishandling of the power
every judge makes use of when managing a case. In
particular, a presumption seems to have been established
according to which no ignorance of community law is to be
tolerated on the part of national judges if the unapplied
provisions would have put an individual in a better position
than he would have been in had they been properly
applied. Obviously, this does not result in a thinning of the
scope of judicial independence, but it is a robust warning
that cannot be unheeded because it calls upon judges’
professional training and updating. This approach also, and
rightly, takes to its heart the legal protection of individuals
living within the European Union.
The second judgment, coming from the Luxembourg
Court of Justice was passed at the beginning of October
2004 in re Pfeiffer. In that case an innovative principle was
laid down. It was stated that the national judge before
whom a dispute between individuals is pending, is bound
to consider the national law as a whole in order to interpret
and apply it in the light of the European measure and the
objective of that measure, so a national provision is chosen
that may address itself to the latter. The relevance of the
new power conferred upon the national judge concerning
the relationship between European and national law should
not be understated.
Effectively the national judge should not only be versed
in European law, but he is also bound to try and identify a
connecting point with the national law in order to bridge
any possible gap between the two. Odd though this may
seem, I think I am allowed to say that if we are to walk
down the road leading to European citizens’ rights, we
need to build a judiciary whose independence should also
be protected outside its national boundaries and inside a
new European context. Until the day has come when all
necessary conditions are met, it is submitted that it is up
to all of us, legal scholars and professionals, to make a
contribution in this vital area.
• This article was taken from a lecture given at the
Institute of Advanced Legal Studies on May 4, 2005.
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